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THE PARADOX OF PUBLIC SECULARISM: 
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF ROBERT AUDI'S 
RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON 
Erik A. Anderson 
This paper critically assesses Robert Audi's formulation and defense of pub-
lic secularism in Religious Commitment and Secular Reason. After explicating 
central elements of Audi's theory, I consider a series of objections against it. 
I argue that Audi's theory can be successfully defended from many of these 
objections. However, in the final section of the paper, I present an objection 
based on the relativity of the secular that I take to successfully undermine his 
principles of public secularism. 
It is a commonplace among educated Americans that the modern state 
must be a secular state and that the task of protecting religious freedom 
requires a separation between church and state, the religious and the secu-
lar, across many domains. Let us call this view public secularism. Many 
people, even highly educated ones, hold a commitment to public secular-
ism seemingly without giving it too much thought. To such people it is 
simply obvious that in a modern, religiously pluralistic society the state, 
in its public actions and pronouncements, must appear in an exclusively 
secular guise. 
But why exactly should we accept public secularism? Is there a con-
vincing philosophical justification for it, or does it abide in the minds of 
its adherents as "a dead dogma, not a living truth"?! Furthermore, what 
exactly is "the secular"? Why and how is "the secular" privileged from 
the point of view of liberal theory over "the religious"? 
Fortunately, the taken-for-granted character of public secularism has 
been remedied to a considerable extent in a number of recent works 
by Robert Audi, in particular his recent book Religious Commitment and 
Secular Reason.2 Audi has presented a comprehensive and powerful ver-
sion of public secularism extending across a number of areas of liberal 
theory and practice. In this paper, I will critically evaluate Audi's case 
for public secularism in one particular domain of application, that of the 
behavior of individual citizens in their acts of political advocacy. Audi 
argues that there should be a separation between "religious and secu-
lar considerations" in "our conduct as citizens" that mirrors the institu-
tional separation between religious and governmental institutions.3 It is 
this claim that shall be my primary focus, although my argument will 
have implications for the separation between the religious and secular 
more generally. 
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I will proceed dialectically by presenting a series of objections to Au-
di's theory and considering whether his view has the resources to gener-
ate responses to each one. While I think Audi can respond successfully 
to some of the objections that I will raise against his view, I will present 
an objection in the final section that I take to be fatal to his version of 
public secularism. 
1. Audi's Principles of Public Secularism 
Audi articulates and defends a number of principles governing how re-
ligious citizens of liberal democracies should conduct themselves when 
they engage in acts of political advocacy. These principles do not express 
legal requirements; that is, they are not intended to specify what religious 
citizens can and cannot do as a matter of their legal rights. Rather, these 
principles capture an ideal of civic virtue, of reasonable, praiseworthy, or 
ideal behavior that goes beyond what it is simply within one's moral or 
legal rights to do.4 
Before presenting Audi's principles in more detail, it is important to 
understand their underlying rationale. According to Audi, what underlies 
principles governing how citizens should conduct themselves in their acts 
of political advocacy is a sincere commitment to the "essential premises" 
of liberal democracy, in particular a commitment to "respecting the au-
tonomy and integrity of persons."s He points out that the autonomy and 
integrity of persons is particularly threatened when citizens and legisla-
tors advocate and enact laws that restrict human conduct. When a citizen 
advocates a law that will have the effect of limiting her fellow citizens' 
liberty backed by the threat of coercion, there is a danger that that law 
will illegitimately restrict the autonomy of her fellow citizens. Respect 
for autonomy does not require that no laws restricting human conduct 
be enacted; rather, laws constraining human conduct are consistent with 
respect for individual autonomy only when they possess the proper kind 
of justification. Here is how Audi makes the point: 
If I am coerced on grounds that cannot motivate me, as a rational in-
formed person, to do the thing in question, I cannot corne to identify 
with the deed and will tend to resent having to do it. ... It is part of 
the underlying rationale of liberal democracy that we not have to 
feel this kind of resentment-that we give up autonomy only where, 
no matter what our specific preferences or our particular world view, 
we can be expected, given adequate rationality and sufficient infor-
mation, to see that we would have (or at least would tend to have) so 
acted on our own.6 
In the context of laws that restrict human conduct, respect for the autono-
my of our fellow citizens requires that we be willing and able to offer a jus-
tification for the law that is "publicly comprehensible," that our fellow citi-
zens can accept independently of religious belief, "esoteric knowledge," or 
"initiation into a subculture."71f we fail to abide by this requirement, we 
subject our fellow citizens to the" alienation and resentment" that attends 
coercive legislation backed only by grounds that they cannot accept. 
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It is in pursuit of this general commitment to respecting the autonomy 
and integrity of citizens in a religiously diverse society that Audi presents 
his principles of civic virtue. The first principle is called the principle of 
secular rationale (PSR). PSR governs the reasons that citizens publicly offer 
in support of their coercive political proposals. PSR holds that each citizen 
has "a prima facie obligation not to advocate or support any law or public 
policy that restricts human conduct, unless one has, and is willing to offer, 
adequate secular reason for this advocacy or support."B 
PSR has two primary components. It requires citizens to offer support-
ing justifications that are both (a) secular and (b) adequate. For my pur-
poses, however, it is the secularity of the supporting justifications that is 
most important, so I will focus my attention exclusively on this compo-
nent. The assumption underlying the requirement of secularity is that sec-
ular reasons are publicly comprehensible in a way that religious reasons 
are not. Secular reasons are uniquely suited to providing justifications that 
our fellow citizens can accept regardless of their religious affiliation (or 
lack thereof). Therefore, appeal to secular reasons is necessary if we are to 
justify our coercive political proposals in a way that shows respect for the 
autonomy and integrity of our fellow citizens. 
Obviously, PSR relies crucially on the distinction between religious and 
secular reasons, so in order to more fully understand the principle, we 
should reflect on Audi's account of this distinction. Audi defines a secular 
reason as 
One whose normative force, that is, its status as a prima facie justi-
ficatory element, does not evidentially depend on the existence of 
God (or on denying it) or on theological considerations, or on the 
pronouncements of a person or institution qua religious authority. 
Roughly, this is to say that a secular reason is a ground that enables 
one to know or have some degree of justification (roughly, evidence 
of some kind) for a proposition, such as a moral principle, indepen-
dently of having knowledge of, or justification for believing, a reli-
gious proposition.9 
A secular reason or argument is one that has "evidential independence" 
or "evidential autonomy" from the truth of any religious propositions or 
the pronouncements of any religious authorities. Its rationally persuasive 
power, its justificatory force, can be appreciated and evaluated indepen-
dently of any religious beliefs and by rational people regardless of what 
religious or non-religious worldview they happen to accept. In this sense, 
a secular argument contrasts with an argument that is "evidentially reli-
gious" in that its premises, conclusion, or the fact that its premises warrant 
its conclusion "cannot be known, or at least cannot be justifiably accepted, 
apart from reliance on religious considerations, for instance scripture or 
revelation or clerical authority."lo 
PSR requires citizens to provide justifications for their coercive po-
litical proposals that are secular in the sense of being evidentially in-
dependent of their religious beliefs. If they are unable to provide such 
a justification, they should refrain from advocating their proposal for 
public acceptance. 
140 Faith and Philosophy 
The second principle, which Audi calls the principle of secular motivation 
(PSM), governs not what justifications people publicly offer but what rea-
sons and arguments actually motivate their advocacy. It is entirely possible 
for a person to offer a secular justification for a law or policy that she does 
not sincerely endorse and that masks an unstated religious motivation for 
supporting the law or policy in question. In this case, the secular justifi-
cation a person gives misrepresents her actual assessment of the issues 
and the considerations that actually motivate her. Her secular justification 
functions as a "screen" for her attempt to pass a proposal that flows en-
tirely from her religious beliefs. PSM prevents this by holding that "one 
has a (prima facie) obligation to abstain from advocacy or support of a law 
or public policy that restricts human conduct, unless in advocating or sup-
porting it one is sufficiently motivated by (normatively) adequate secular 
reason."ll If a citizen finds that she does not possess adequate secular mo-
tivation for a proposal to restrict human conduct, even if she knows and is 
willing to offer a secular justification for it that others would find persua-
sive, she should refrain from advocating the proposal. 
PSR and PSM thus put constraints on citizens' reliance on their religious 
beliefs in the public sphere. These constraints do not take the form of an 
outright prohibition on invoking religious beliefs. Rather, they require 
that any religious reasons for laws and public policies be accompanied 
(at both the justificatory and motivational levels) by evidentially adequate 
non-religious reasons. 
II. The Fragmentation and Indeterminacy of the Secular 
Audi's public secularism, at least in the form in which I want to evaluate 
it, takes the form of his two principles of PSR and PSM. I now want to 
present Audi's position with a series of objections and then see whether 
his view has the resources to meet them. Each of the objections focuses 
on the notion of secular reasons, in particular on whether there really is 
a set of reasons, adequate for all of the political debates that occupy citi-
zens in contemporary liberal democracies, that possesses the evidential 
neutrality and public comprehensibility that is supposed to characterize 
secular reasons. 
To understand the first objection, consider on what basis Audi recom-
mends secular reasons as the appropriate basis for political deliberation 
and action in a democratic society. Secular reasons are "reasons of a kind 
that any rational adult citizens can endorse as sufficient" to justify laws 
and public policies. 12 Audi's characterization of secular reasons suggests 
that "the secular" denotes a single set of reasons that are accessible to all 
rational adults and that can form the lingua franca of a religiously diverse 
democracy. But does "the secular" really denote a single, unified set of 
reasons? Isn't it rather the case that "the secular," at least as convention-
ally understood, denotes a heterogeneous assemblage of conflicting and 
competing approaches to moral and political questions? And doesn't this 
diversity undermine the claim that "the secular" should be uniquely priv-
ileged in relation to "the religious" in our account of civic virtue? 
It is undeniable that when we turn to what are conventionally regarded 
as secular approaches to morality and politics, we do not find a single set 
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of secular reasons but a multiplicity of incompatible approaches. Instead 
of "secular reason" we find utilitarian reasons, natural law reasons, Kan-
tian reasons, virtue theoretic reasons, libertarian reasons, Hobbesian rea-
sons, feminist reasons, socialist reasons, postmodern reasons, and so on. If 
we assume that these are all sources of "secular reasons," it is hard to see 
how such reasons constitute a single set of reasons at all, much less a single 
set that can be set over against "the religious" (another heterogeneous as-
semblage) as uniquely "endorsable" by all rational persons. 
I call this the fragmentation of the secular objection. Although he does not 
refer to it as such, Philip L. Quinn rejects Audi's PSR and PSM principles 
on the basis of this objection. Quinn argues that secular moral theories are 
just as controversial among rational adults as religious ones. Given the 
diversity of secular approaches to moral and political theory, there is no 
basis for claiming that secular reasons as such are more "acceptable" to all 
rational persons than religious reasons. J3 Therefore, either controversial 
secular and religious beliefs should both be excluded from public political 
deliberation, or they should both be included. There is no basis for the dif-
ferential treatment of the religious and the secular as such. 
How can Audi respond to this objection? I want to explore two pos-
sible lines of response. The first response, which I will consider through 
the remainder of this section, would have Audi deny that by "secular" he 
means what are conventionally labeled secular moral and political theo-
ries. Rather, the secular primarily refers to a set of moral principles that are 
intuitively or self-evidently true and which any plausible moral theory 
(religious or secular) must recognize and accommodate. 
In order to arrive at this more refined understanding of secular rea-
sons, Audi appeals to a distinction between "agreement in reasons" and 
"agreement on reasons."14 Agreement in reasons is "a matter of accept-
ing the same first-order prima facie normative judgments on the same 
grounds," while agreement on reasons is "agreement on some theoreti-
calor other proposition about those grounds."15 The point of this distinc-
tion is that rational people can agree on a number of moral principles and 
judgments (agreement in reasons) without agreeing on what moral theory 
best explains and justifies these principles and judgments (agreement on 
reasons). As Audi puts it, "extensive agreement in moral practice is com-
patible with absence of agreement or even sharp disagreement in moral 
theory."16 Thus, secular reasons consist of shared moral principles that the 
adherents of competing secular and religious moral theories can be ex-
pected to accept, even if they hold conflicting views as to which theory 
best accounts for these shared principles. 
But why should we expect this agreement at the level of moral prin-
ciples? In support of this expectation, Audi distinguishes between two 
different levels of moral theory and practice. This distinction follows 
from his reading of W. D. Ross, who maintains that "the verdicts of the 
moral consciousness of the best people" are "the foundation" on which 
moral philosophies should be built: "The moral convictions of thoughtful 
and well-educated people are the data of ethics just as sense-perceptions 
are the data of natural science."17 The moral convictions or intuitions of 
rational people (or at least people who have attained a certain level of 
education and maturity) form the pre-theoretical data that we construct 
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moral theories to justify, systematize, and explain. The division between 
this foundational level of moral intuition and the second-order level of 
moral theory underlies Audi's distinction between agreement in reasons 
and agreement on reasons and explains why the former need not entail 
the latter. 
Of course, pre-theoretical moral intuitions appear to be the subject of 
controversy among rational people as much as anything else. A further 
feature of Audi's moral theory addresses this worry. Audi follows Ross 
in holding that at least some of these pre-theoretical intuitions express 
principles of moral obligation-Ross's prima facie moral duties-that are 
self-evidently true. 18 We can expect a large measure of rational agreement 
where self-evident moral principles are concerned even if, strictly speak-
ing, it is not impossible for rational people to disagree or be mistaken 
about which principles truly enjoy this status.19 
With these aspects of Audi's view in place, we can understand how 
he can grant that there is a large measure of rational disagreement over 
which secular moral theory is the correct one while still holding that there 
are secular reasons that are acceptable to any rational person. From this 
perspective, conflicting secular moral theories are not secular reasons. 
Rather secular reasons consist of self-evident principles of prima facie 
duty along with whatever fachlal beliefs are necessary to apply them. 
Audi can thus claim that for the purposes of democratic deliberation in 
a religiously pluralistic society, both secular and religious moral theories 
should be precluded from forming the sole basis for a citizen's political 
proposals. PSR and PSM should be interpreted as requiring appeal to sec-
ular reasons understood in this more restricted sense; they should /lot be 
interpreted as requiring or allowing non-religious citizens to rely on their 
secular moral theories while religious citizens are prohibited from relying 
on their religious moral theories. 
Here then is a way for Audi to maintain the unity and rational accept-
ability of secular reasons in the face of the fragmentation of secular moral 
and political theory. In order for this response to succeed, however, it must 
be the case that citizens can justify their political proposals in all cases 
without having to invoke competing moral theories as essential grounds 
for those proposals. Self-evident moral principles and whatever factual 
assumptions are needed to apply them must provide a sufficient basis for 
all proposals for laws and policies restricting human conduct. If these are 
not sufficient, then the secular, conceived as what is acceptable to all ratio-
nal persons, will require supplementation by moral theories that are not 
secular in this sense, and the question will arise once again why theories 
that are conventionally labeled 'secular' should be allowed to play this 
supplementary role while religious ones are not. 
Is the secular-as-self-evident sufficient in the required way? It seems to 
me that it is unlikely to be so for reasons that stem from Audi's own moral 
theory. To see this, consider first that Audi's self-evident moral principles 
can be situated in larger moral theories that systematize, explain, and pro-
vide additional justification for them: 
There can be a moral theory that both explains and provides infer-
ential grounds for moral propositions which, given sufficient reflec-
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tion, can also be seen, non-inferentially, to be true. What is at one 
time only a conclusion of reflection-and in that way a candidate 
to be an intuition-can become a conclusion of inference. It can still 
derive support simultaneously from both the newly found premises 
for it and any remaining intuitive sense of its truth. An appropriately 
non-inferential, pre-theoretical sense of its truth may survive one's 
inferring it from premises.20 
Audi's point here is that a moral principle can receive independent evi-
dential support from multiple sources, e.g., both from itself (in virtue of 
being self-evident) and from a supporting moral theory.21 
Not only can self-evident moral principles be situated within larger 
moral theories, there are good reasons for doing so. Moral theories have 
important roles to play where self-evident moral principles are concerned, 
even if those principles possess adequate justification in the absence of any 
supporting theory. First, moral theories enable us to systematize self-evident 
moral principles. Ross holds that there is a plurality of self-evident moral 
principles that cannot be reduced to any single over arching principle and 
that can conflict in particular cases. When this happens, we need some 
basis for prioritizing one moral principle over another. Ross provides little 
guidance as to how these judgments should be made. According to Audi, 
however, it precisely here that moral theory can be useful in providing a 
systematization of self-evident moral principles that provides grounds for 
ranking one more highly than another in cases of conflict.22 
Second, moral theory has an important role to play in falsifying moral 
principles that we might mistakenly regard as self-evidently true. Audi 
holds a conception of the self-evident according to which our judgments 
that a particular proposition is self-evident are defeasible. Both Ross and 
Audi hold that intuitively grasped moral principles do not depend on 
moral theories for their justification. But according to Audi, this does not 
make these principles completely independent of moral theories. These 
principles can have what he calls "negative epistemic dependence" on 
moral theories: 
An intuition may be defeated and abandoned in the light of theoreti-
cal results incompatible with its truth, especially when these results 
are supported by other intuitions. This is a kind of negative epistemic 
dependence of intuition on theory[.] ... It is negative dependence 
on-in the sense of a vulnerability to-disconfirmation by theories, 
whether actual or possible.23 
While a moral theory is not necessary to justify self-evident moral prin-
ciples, such a theory can serve to falsify apparently self-evident principles 
that tum out to be false. 
My purpose in exploring Audi's moral theory is to show that, given his 
own views, it follows that competing moral theories-secular as well as 
religious-will often have an essential role to play in justifying the politi-
cal judgments of citizens. Consider first the role that moral theories are 
supposed to play in systematizing self-evident moral principles. This sys-
tematization provides us with a theoretical basis for determining which 
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principle takes priority when two or more give us conflicting directives in 
a particular case. Now suppose two citizens hold different moral theories, 
one of which ranks principle A higher than principle B in cases of conflict, 
while the other provides the reverse ranking. If the political question is 
whether we should adopt a law or policy that embodies principle A or 
principle B, then the reason one citizen has for preferring A evidentially 
depends on his moral theory, while the reason the other citizen has for 
preferring B evidentially depends on her moral theory. If these two citi-
zens offer public justifications for their preferred courses of action, they 
cannot avoid appealing to their competing moral theories as the basis for 
their judgments. The self-evident moral principles themselves and the 
facts of the case alone will not be sufficient. 
Now imagine a different case. Here two citizens hold two different 
moral theories, one of which entails that apparently self-evident moral 
principle A is actually false, the other of which supports its truth. The first 
person will declare A to be false and thus not a legitimate basis for restric-
tive laws or policies; he might instead champion an alternative course of 
action that invokes principle B. The second person, on the other hand, 
judges A to be self-evidently true because it is not falsified by her moral 
theory. She sees principle A to be a perfectly legitimate ground for justify-
ing restrictive laws or policies. Suppose further that principle B is falsified 
by her theory, so that she makes exactly the reverse assessment of the truth 
of A and B as the first citizen. Now imagine that the first citizen proposes 
the acceptance of a law or policy based on principle B, while the second 
proposes the acceptance of one based on principle A. If these two citizens 
engage in public debate over the issue, the first person cannot avoid ap-
pealing to his moral theory as the basis on which he rejects A and accepts 
B, while the second cannot avoid appealing to her moral theory as the 
basis on which she accepts A and rejects B. Once again, the apparently 
self-evident principles A and B themselves are not sufficient to explain 
or justify the different positions these two citizens take. Their competing 
moral theories play an essential role. 
It follows, therefore, that on Audi's own view the secular-as-self-
evident is unlikely to be evidentially adequate for citizens when they 
justify their proposals in the public sphere. Taken in isolation from moral 
theory, the secular as self-evident suffers from justificational indetermina-
cy-it cannot determine how competing principles are to be ranked or 
on what basis conflicting moral intuitions are to be resolved. I call this 
problem the indeterminacy of the secular. If the secular-as-self-evident is 
indeterminate (at least in some cases) then Audi cannot resort solely to 
this notion in addressing the fragmentation of the secular. Instead, he 
must go further and argue that only secular moral theories are entitled to 
play the supplementary role necessary to give determinacy to self-evi-
dent moral principles. I will explore whether there is some way he can do 
this in the next section. 
III. Toward a More Adequate Conception of the Secular 
Earlier I mentioned that there are two possible responses Audi might 
make to the fragmentation of the secular objection. The second response 
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potentially affords Audi a way to respond to this objection while simul-
taneously explaining why only secular moral theories should be allowed 
to play an essential justificatory role. This response claims that there is a 
distinction between a reason's being comprehensible to all rational persons, 
on the one hand, and its being acceptable to all rational persons on the 
other.24 These two statuses are not equivalent. To say that a reason is com-
prehensible is to say that its persuasive force as a reason can be rationally 
assessed by any person regardless of his or her religious beliefs. Roughly, 
the evidential force of a comprehensible reason can be grasped without 
the prior acceptance (or rejection) of any religious beliefs. But compre-
hensibility does not entail that a rational person must accept the evidential 
force of a reason as conclusive. A rational person can reject a reason that 
is publicly comprehensible. While self-evidence entails comprehensibility, 
comprehensibility does not entail self-evidence. 
Audi can defend his principles of public secularism by arguing that 
secular reasons need only possess the quality of comprehensibility rather 
than the further quality of acceptability. Thus the fragmentation of the 
secular, the existence of a multiplicity of secular approaches to moral and 
political theorizing and the consequence that no particular secular ap-
proach is likely to be accepted by all rational citizens, need not under-
mine Audi's distinction between the religious and the secular. For secular 
theories do not acquire their status as secular by virtue of being accept-
able to all rational citizens. Rather, they acquire that status by being com-
prehensible to all such citizens-by invoking considerations whose evi-
dential force can be grasped and assessed independently of any citizens' 
religious beliefs. 
If we add the secular-as-comprehensible to the secular-as-self-evident, 
we get the following (more complex) picture. Audi's principles PSR and 
PSM require citizens to attempt to justify their political proposals solely 
in terms of self-evident moral principles (and whatever factual assump-
tions are needed to apply them); if, in doing so, it is necessary to advert to 
some moral theory, the only theories allowed to play an essential justifi-
catory role are those that are secular in the sense of publicly comprehen-
sible. Audi can employ these two conceptions of the secular to respond 
to Quinn by claiming that if moral theories are necessary for purposes of 
political justification, there is a basis for allowing secular but not religious 
moral theories to play such a role, even though such theories fall short of 
being acceptable to all rational persons. 
This is a promising response to the above objection, but more needs to 
be said for it to be fully successful. The problem is that to say that all secu-
lar moral theories are comprehensible in a way that all religious moral 
theories are not appears to assume that there is "some sort of epistemo-
logical divide or discontinuity" between the religious and the secular that 
is hard to justify.25 Defining the secular as what is uniquely comprehen-
sible to all rational persons seems to presuppose that religious views rely 
on "special" kinds of evidence for their acceptance, evidence that is not 
available to persons generally. But it is not clear that religious views rely 
on evidence that is essentially "special," "personal," or "private" when 
compared to the kinds of considerations that lead people to become Kan-
tians, utilitarians, Aristotelians, and so on. 
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The possibility that there is no blanket epistemological distinction be-
tween secular and religious moral theories calls attention to the fact that 
once we leave the secular-as-self-evident behind, the distinction between 
the religious and the secular is not at all obvious or unproblematic. Let us 
see if we can remedy this problem. 
Kenneth A. Strike has brilliantly elucidated one reason why the dis-
tinction between the religious and the secular is so fuzzy and elusive.26 
Strike points out that the notion of the secular suffers from an ambiguity. 
The term 'secular' refers to two quite different "ethical languages" in our 
public and philosophical discourse, though we often fail to notice this fact. 
First, 'secular' can refer to what Strike calls a Secular Neutral Ethical Lan-
guage (SNEL), which aspires to be a religiously neutral public language. A 
SNEL is formulated in concepts that have been deliberately "disassociat-
ed" from "specifically religious concepts," and is a form of "moral pidgin 
suitable for discoursing about public affairs, but insufficient for discours-
ing about the full range of issues concerning the good life for human be-
ings."27 The notion of a SNEL captures the kind of secular public language 
that Audi himself is trying to discover and promote. 
However, 'secular' also refers to something quite different from this. 
Contrasting with the secular-as-religiously-neutral is what we might call 
the secular-as-religiously-antagonistic, or what Strike calls a Secular Reli-
giously Antagonistic Ethical Language (SRAEL). SRAEL's have two pri-
mary features: (i) they are deliberately and explicitly based upon rejecting 
the claims of traditional religions in a particular social context. Their pro-
ponents "are engaged in a project that they understand as reconstructing 
ethics in way that replaces religious foundations with non-religious foun-
dations."2s They assume as a their fundamental starting point something 
like, "since God as traditionally conceived does not exist." (ii) SRAELs do 
not simply propose different philosophical foundations for moral views 
but "generate competing substantive views of a good life and of moral 
obligation" that are more or less incompatible with the religious views 
they strive to replace.29 As examples of SRAELs Strike includes Marxism, 
atheistic versions of existentialism, naturalism, and humanism, and more 
con troversiall y, utilitarianism. 30 
Disambiguating the term 'secular' in the way Strike proposes enables 
us to understand both it and its distinction from 'religion' more precisely. 
For one thing, we can now see that we need not a two-term distinction 
between the religious and the secular but a three-term distinction that 
makes explicit the difference between SNELs and SRAELs. Henceforth, 
I will use the term 'secular' to refer only to a SNEL or the secular-as-
religiously-neutral, and the term' atheistic' to refer to a SRAEL or the 
secular-as-religiously-antagonistic. 
Properly understood, the secular is defined not by one but by two ne-
gations: the secular is the non-religious in that it does not evidentially de-
pend on any religious beliefs, but it is also the non-atheistic in that it does 
not evidentially depend on any atheistic beliefs, i.e., beliefs that deny the 
truth of any religious beliefs. Audi's own definition of a secular reason 
implicitly supports this three-term categorization: a secular reason is "one 
whose normative force ... does not evidentially depend on the existence 
of God (or on denying it)."3! Audi's principles should thus prohibit citizens 
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from advocating laws and public policies on the sole basis of reasons that 
are atheistic as opposed to secular. If the secular-as-self-evident requires 
supplementation by moral theories in order to be determinately applied 
in particular cases, Audi's principles should rule out any essential reliance 
on moral theories that are atheistic or elements of a SRAEL. 
Now that we have achieved an increase in conceptual clarity regarding 
the religious and the secular, the next thing is to see if we can flesh out 
these abstract concepts and give them enough substance to make then 
practically useful. The following approach seems the most reasonable one 
to adopt. Rather than defining "the religious" primarily in terms of its 
alleged epistemological uniqueness, we should initially define it in terms 
of the content that it paradigmatically receives in our particular social con-
text. By "content" I mean not only what religious beliefs are paradigmati-
cally about, but also the ritual, moral, and institutional forms in which 
these beliefs are paradigmatically expressed and embodied. Since "reli-
gion" has no essence and admits of no non-controversial definition, we 
have no choice but to begin with paradigms or un controversial instances 
of religion; we can then extend the meaning and reference of the term 
'religion' outward from our paradigm on the basis of degrees of similarity 
or "family resemblance." 
This is roughly the way Audi proceeds. He lists a number of criteria 
that apply to "the richest paradigms of religion, such as Christianity, Ju-
daism, and Islam," which can then be used to pick out instances that bear 
substantial similarities to these central cases.32 Elsewhere he states that 
his principles are meant to apply in the first instance to religions in "the 
Hebraic-Christian tradition" or that are forms of "standard Western the-
ism."oJ For Audi, then, we give content to the concept of religion by re-
flecting on the dominant religious traditions of the West; on the concepts 
of God, his nature, his actions, and his purposes that are central to these 
traditions; also on the institutional forms these traditions have taken, in-
cluding their practices of worship, their peculiar forms of evidence and 
argument, and the obligations they typically impose on their adherents. 
These contingent features of "standard Western theism" give substance 
to our concept of the religious. In relation to this substantive content we 
can then define what can be known independently of these beliefs and 
practices (the secular) and what can be known only on the basis of their 
repudiation (the atheistic). 
With the three-part distinction between the religious, the secular, and 
the atheistic in place, we can return to the question of whether Audi can 
maintain that secular moral theories are publicly comprehensible in a way 
that religious moral theories are not. It seems to me that he can. If we in-
terpret the secular as that which is neither religious nor atheistic and give 
content to the religious by reference to standard Western theism, we can 
say that secular moral theories are those that do not presuppose or entail 
the truth of any claims about the God of standard Western theism. Nor do 
they presuppose or entail the falsity of any of those claims. The truth or 
efficacy of secular moral theories is compatible with either the existence 
or non-existence of God. Such theories are not necessarily acceptable to all 
rational citizens, because while they incorporate any self-evident moral 
truths that may exist, they go beyond the self-evident and add concepts, 
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explanations, and justifications that a person can rationally reject. But 
these theories are comprehensible to all rational citizens. The whole process 
of deciding which of these theories to accept can take place independently 
of having to accept or reject any claims about the existence and nature of 
God (at least as standard Western theists conceive of God). 
Perhaps, therefore, Audi needn't rely on any claims about the special 
epistemological nature of religious beliefs-e.g., that they rely on some 
special source of evidence that is not publicly available to non-adherents-
in order to justify his distinction between religious and secular moral the-
ories. It is sufficient for his purposes that, whatever the evidential basis 
and epistemic credentials of standard Western theism, there exists a set 
of moral theories that are evidentially independent of its truth or falsity. 
These will be moral theories that standard Western theists can see God as 
having made available to rational persons generally, independently of any 
special religious experiences or revelations.34 
In light of the objections we have considered so far, the claim that secu-
lar moral theories are comprehensible in a way that religious (and athe-
istic) ones are not appears to be a defensible one.35 Audi can claim that 
where the secular-as-self-evident requires theoretical supplementation, 
citizens ought to rely essentially only on secular moral theories and not 
on religious ones. I turn now to consideration of an objection that I take 
to successfully undermine Audi's principles of public secularism even on 
this more refined understanding of the secular. 
IV The Relativity of the Secular 
On the contextual approach to defining religion employed above, what 
counts as religious is culturally and historically specific, defined in terms of 
what has in fact served the West as its paradigm case of religion. Atheism, 
too, takes a culturally and historically specific form as what we might call 
"standard Western atheism," since its rejection of standard Western theism 
is its defining trait. The secular as the non-religious and non-atheistic must 
also take a culturally and historically specific form, at in least part.36 
Now consider on what assumptions we can plausibly expect that a his-
torically and culturally specific conception of the religious, secular, and 
atheistic will enable citizens in a religiously diverse democracy to apply 
PSR and PSM. In my judgment, this framework could plausibly play the 
role Audi wants it to only given a crucial (if unstated) simplifying assump-
tion: that the citizens who are to utilize it fall into either the standard West-
ern theist or atheist camps, or do not depart too radically from the beliefs 
held by the members of one or the other of these two groups. 
Only if the terms 'religion' and' atheism' have a commonly agreed upon 
reference will all rational citizens converge upon a common notion of the 
secular as the religiously neutral. If citizens in a liberal democracy under-
stand by 'religion' Audi's standard Western theism, they can be expected 
to take a certain range of truths, moral truths and truths about the natural 
world, to be publicly comprehensible. If they understand by atheism the 
repudiation of standard Western theism, then it is plausible to suppose 
that they nonetheless can accept the same set of truths as comprehensible 
to all rational persons. 
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But now let us ask whether this framework is sufficient for purposes 
of public deliberation on the more realistic assumption that our liberal 
democracy includes a much wider range of religious diversity, includ-
ing non-standard Western theists, standard non-Western theists, and stan-
dard non-Western non-theists. Will this framework be adequate when our 
rational citizens are not mainstream Christians and Jews but Old Order 
Amish, Christian Scientists, Seventh Day Adventists, Hasidic Jews, Mor-
mons, and fundamentalists of various stripes? Will it be adequate when 
our rational citizens are Buddhists, Native Americans, Confucians, Mus-
lims, and Hindus? My knowledge of these various religious traditions is 
not extensive enough for me to answer these questions in detail, but it 
seems to me that if one takes a different religious worldview as the stan-
dard, paradigm, or baseline in terms of which 'religion' is defined, then it 
is entirely possible and in fact likely that one will end up with a concep-
tion of the secular-as-religiously-neutral that is not coextensive with this 
notion as defined in relation to standard Western theism. I call this the 
relativity of the secular objection. 
Instead of political debate among standard Western theists and atheists, 
let us briefly consider a more exotic (i.e., real) case, the debate between 
Christian Science parents and members of the mainstream legal and medi-
cal communities over whether Christian Science parents should have the 
legal right to withhold conventional medical treatment from their chil-
dren.37 How does the religious/secular/atheistic framework function when 
used to apply Audi's principles to this particular debate? 
The first thing to point out is that for mainstream medical practitioners 
and their supporters, conceiving of the health and well-being of children 
in terms of the theories and procedures of scientific medicine is a purely 
secular affair. These people accept what we can call the medical model of 
health and healing according to which the human body is a natural system 
situated in a natural world that can be known and manipulated without 
drawing on either religious or antireligious premises. This kind of medi-
cal naturalism is comprehensible to adherents of standard Western theism 
and atheism. Combined with moral principles such as "children ought not 
to be abused, injured, or caused to suffer and die" and "children should 
not be allowed to die when they can be saved"38 that are arguably either 
self-evident or derivable from self-evident principles, the medical model 
of health and healing provides a justification for forcing Christian Science 
parents to seek conventional medical treatment for their children. From 
mainstream theistic and atheistic points of view, the justification for inter-
vention is entirely secular. 
Now consider the beliefs that lead Christian Scientists to reject con-
ventional medical care for their children. In metaphysical terms, Chris-
tian Scientists are idealists.39 They believe that the physical world and 
everything in it (including the body and disease) are ultimately illusory. 
Following the teachings of their founder, Mary Baker Eddy, Christian Sci-
entists reason that "if God, infinite Mind, is All," then nothing that con-
tradicts God's nature can be rea1.40 This means that neither matter (which 
they believe contradicts the spiritual nature of God) nor evil (which they 
believe contradicts God's goodness) is ultimately real. What human be-
ings perceive as "the physical universe" is nothing but the "conscious 
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and unconscious thoughts of mortals" who are alienated from GodY The 
physical world with its sin, illness, and death is nothing but the creation 
of erring human minds. Reality, in contrast, is entirely spiritual, consist-
ing wholly of God and the spirits of individual human beings who exist 
as ideas in the divine mind. Spiritual reality is perfectly harmonious: hu-
man beings in their real nature as divine ideas are without sin, illness, 
suffering, or death. 
As idealists, Christian Scientists hold that what we perceive as the phys-
ical world is "plastic" and can be changed by changing our beliefs about 
it. 42 They interpret prayer as "the search for an increased understanding 
of spiritual reality" that, when attained, transforms the physical world in 
ways that reflect (to greater or lesser degrees) the perfection and harmony 
of spiritual reality. 43 Christian Scientists believe that if a person achieves 
this awareness, she will experience a healing that demonstrates or exem-
plifies the depth of her spiritual understanding. Significantly, Christian 
Scientists also believe that children can undergo vicarious healing as a 
result of the prayers of others, including their parents. 
As I noted above, the justification for forcing Christian Scientists to 
accept treatment would most likely assume the validity of the medical 
model of health and healing. The question I want to raise is whether this 
justification, which is secular from the perspective of standard Western 
theism and atheism, is secular from the perspective of Christian Science. 
In my judgment it is not, and this fact poses a deep problem for Audi's 
principles of public secularism. 
Christian Scientists would most likely declare the belief that the human 
body is a natural system situated in a natural world that can be known 
independently of God to be an atheistic rather than a secular belief. They 
would view the belief that there is an independently existing material 
world, filled with physical bodies, disease, illness, and death as eviden-
tially dependent upon a rejection of God's nature as they conceive it. The 
existence of matter is not something that can be secularly known: it is part 
and parcel of an erroneous, anti-religious perspective, the product of a pri-
mordial fall from grace. Scientific medicine does not produce true health 
and well-being but reinforces and perpetuates the rejection of God. The 
true good for human beings consists in their achieving the awareness that 
only God or "Infinite Mind" is real, an awareness that Christian Scientists 
believe transforms the apparently physical world in the direction of true 
health and perfection.44 
If I am right, then based on the very non-standard theological assump-
tions of Christian Science, conventional medicine does not count as a sec-
ular from their point of view. The general point that follows from this 
example is that since the entire religious/secular/atheistic framework re-
ceives its content from certain religious beliefs and practices taken as para-
digmatic, the content specified by the framework is relative to whatever 
religion(s) serve as its starting point. A particular "filling in" of the content 
of the religious, secular, and atheistic will depend ultimately on assump-
tions about what to count as paradigmatically religious in a particular 
context. 'Secularity' is thus not an intrinsic, religiously neutral feature of 
a set of beliefs; the definition of the secular as religiously neutral is made 
from a vantage point that is not itself religiously neutral. 
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Any dispute over what counts as secular between minority religions 
like Christian Science and mainstream theists and atheists will implicate 
more fundamental issues that cannot be resolved within the domain of 
the secular. If the view of the mainstream medical and legal communities 
carries the day, Christian Science parents will find their liberty restricted 
for reasons that count as secular from dominant perspectives but not from 
their perspective. A political proposal that mainstream citizens might de-
fend in terms of Audi's PSR and PSM principles would constitute a kind of 
religious imposition from the perspective of a religious minority, a form of 
coercion that, given their theology, they could rightly resent, be alienated 
by, and see as not respecting their autonomy. 
In response to their complaints, we (non-Scientists) might say that we 
simply take as definitive of the religious what in our social context has 
always served as the paradigm of religion, Audi's standard Western the-
ism. But then the secular encodes a kind of majoritarian bias in favor of 
"normal" or "mainstream" religion. This would be especially ironic, since 
Audi defends his public secularism as necessary in part for the protec-
tion of religious minorities.45 On the other hand, we might say that we 
define the secular in the way we do because it flows from the true theis-
tic (or atheistic) perspective. But this would once again be ironic because 
we would be restricting the liberty of religious minorities in the name of 
religious (or antireligious) truth, which is precisely the kind of religious 
imposition that public secularism is supposed to avoid. 
Audi's public secularism produces this kind of paradoxical result in 
conditions of radical religious diversity. In a society as religiously diverse 
as the United States, the secular does not possess the stable and shared 
meaning that would enable it to be the lingua franca for all of our political 
deliberation. Audi has thus failed to justify the claim that citizens must 
rely on the secular in their justificatory encounters because the secular-
defined as it typically is from dominant perspectives-will often fail to be 
a way of showing respect for religious minorities. 
Audi might respond to this objection by stressing that his principles of 
public secularism are only prima facie principles, which means that they 
can be overridden in some cases. He might then say that when dealing 
with cases of political disagreement that are ultimately rooted in radical 
religious differences, we are entitled to set aside his principles and find 
some other basis for public argument. 
But this response would render Audi's principles inapplicable in pre-
cisely those cases where arguably we are in the greatest need of principles 
of civic virtue. Moreover, I don't think this response adequately addresses 
the problem of the relativity of the secular. If we accept Audi's principles 
of secular reason as prima facie obligating we are lulled into a false sense 
that what counts as secular from our (mainstream, dominant) perspec-
tives is intrinsically and absolutely so. It is a short step from here to the 
dismissal of the complaints of religious minorities (especially unpopular 
ones) on the grounds that their adherents are irrational, unreasonable, or 
unwilling to argue in publicly comprehensible terms. Citizens need to be 
aware that in light of the increasing religious diversity of societies like the 
United States, they cannot take "the secular" for granted, especially when 
dealing with religious minorities. 
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Nothing I have argued here entails that the attempt to create what 
Strike calls a SNEL for our society should be abandoned. But we must 
first recognize that any particular SNEL is neutral only in a particular con-
text and only among the views of some (most likely the dominant) reli-
gious perspectives.46 In the face of more radical religious differences, we 
encounter conflicts over what constitutes the secular itself. We then have 
no recourse but to engage deeper metaphysical, theological, and episte-
mological issues over what diverse interlocutors can come to accept-at 
the end of a dialogue that more closely resembles interfaith dialogue than 
secular public discourse-as having been "revealed" to all persons. This 
kind of public discussion has as its aim the creation or discovery of new 
areas of convergence, new forms of SNEL, between religious and atheistic 
perspectives that have hitherto been alien to each other. 
The kind of discussion I envision between the adherents of radically 
different religious and atheistic perspectives should no doubt be governed 
by principles of civic virtue of the kind Audi proposes, but these cannot be 
principles of secular reason. What these alternative principles are remains 
to be seen. Identifying them forms the positive task corresponding to my 
critique of Audi's public secularism.47 
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